Some key themes, and the Election Night data which should support them, include:

   
• The economy reigns supreme.  It's hard to deny that this issue has won news cycle after news cycle for Democrats.  Democratic messaging on the economy has been superb, and McCain's hail Mary move only made things worse for the Republicans.  The Democrats have argued that Republicans are out-of-touch, uncaring, corrupt, and ideologically unable to manage a complex economy.  Republicans argued that ACORN is registering Mickey Mouse.  On top of the Democratic critique of Republican policies, there is a solid progressive proposal emerging to solve the problem, and it's easy to grasp: develop the green collar economy.  The mandate for economic reform is clear and overwhelming, and Obama has clearly been running on this idea.  Look at the issue priority questions in the exit polls to verify this theme, but expect the economy to rank as the #1 issue.
           
   
• The extraordinary motivation of the Democratic base, and the strength of Obama's ground game.  Nate Silver's On the Road series at 538 has established tons of anecodtal evidence of this massive differential in volunteer enthusiasm.  The partisan registration gap, showing Democrats with a 7-9% registration advantage depending on who's reporting, is further proof of this motivation; it is also a result of that motivation, as Democratic volunteers register more and more Democrats.
           
   
• Growth in the size and enthusiasm of the African American electorate.  The early voting numbers in some states already indicate this theme, but the most visible proof of it will be nail-biting numbers out of North Carolina and Georgia.  If these states go for Obama, or are too close to call going late into the evening, this theme should emerge as an important factor in Obama's victory.
           
   
• Growth in the Latino electorate, and a return to the Democratic Party.  The polls so far have supported this theme, but the most visible demonstration of it will be an Obama hat trick in Colorado, New Mexico, and Nevada, or possibly a larger-than-expected early win in Florida.  The Florida scenario is a bit unlikely (and could be written off to a variety of other factors besides), and the Western scenario won't play out until late at night, possibly 11 pm EST or later.  So this theme is likely to receive a bit less attention. That's a shame, as I was hoping to see the 2007 rallies vindicated and proven effective.

   
• Obama's strength among young voters.  Future Majority, I'm sure, will be all over this theme in many different angles.  But let me try to get the party started.  First, young voters have not been, historically, much more Democratic than the rest of the electorate.  They were about 9% more Democratic than the rest of the electorate in 80, 4% less Democratic in 84, 1% more Democratic in 88, 1% more Democratic in 92, 12% more Democratic in 96, no more Democratic in 2000, and 16% more Democratic in 2004.  (I'm looking at the numbers for 18-24 year olds, as compared to the entire electorate, at the Roper Center's archive.)  Kerry in 2004 was the Democrat best supported by 18-24 year olds, and Obama will likely win this age set by 20 points, and maybe more.  Second, combining this historical data with the fact that young voters voted 14% more Democratic than the nation as a whole in 2006 (and here I'm mixing and matching a bit, using the 18-29 numbers from the CNN archive), we have an interesting result: young voters will have voted Democratic in overwhelming numbers three elections in a row.  That makes this demographic a likely Democratic lock for a long time to come.  This is a huge and extremely diverse demographic, it's solidly Democratic, and it's not going anywhere anytime soon.  That spells long-term disaster for the Republicans.
           
   
• Obama's weakness with white males.  It remains to be seen whether this weakness will, in fact, pan out on Election Day - the way things are going, nearly any demographic scenario seems plausible.  But the recent Research 2000 numbers suggest Obama will basically split male voters with McCain, and lose white voters emphatically, by 10-13 points.  It seems reasonable to believe that Obama will win without much help from Joe the plumber.
           
   
• The death of the Bradley effect.  Related to the above, it will be interesting to see if Obama significantly underperforms the polls among white voters.  I am hoping to see the polls show Obama pull about as many white voters as were predicted by the polls, which would, hopefully, ring the death knell for the Bradley effect.  This canard has hampered the electoral prospects of far too many statewide African American candidates already.
           
   
• Continuing weakness with white Evangelicals.  Issues with a religious overtone have taken a backseat throughout this election cycle, but it's worth noting that the once-or-more-a-week white Evangelical crowd is still solidly in the Republican camp, and seem entirely unaffected by the economic news.  Street Prophets has more.
           
   
• New geographic firewall.  A win in Virginia, Ohio or Colorado should solidify the status of each of those states as a Democratic stronghold, having elected Democrats repeatedly in recent statewide elections, and now sealing the deal on a Democratic White House.  This firewall, if it holds, makes a Republican victory in 2012 nearly impossible.
           
   
• Un-real America responds.  An Obama victory in Virginia, paticularly one driven by strength in unexpected parts of the state, the defeat of Michele Bachmann, and to some degree the defeat of Saxby Chambliss would support a theme of revenge for the tasteless un-American comments that have been a mainstay of Republican politics for so long.  Obama strength in suburban areas would also drive this theme.
           
   
• Individual symbolic victories.  Victories by progressive heroes like Darcy Burner and Al Franken, and the defeat of Prop. 8 in California, would demonstrate the strength of the progressive movement.  Defeat of Saxby Chambliss (see above) or Mitch McConnell would be particularly crushing for Republicans.
           
   
• The union vote.  Over the past few months, union leaders have been expressing some fear that some of their white members would defect to McCain rather than voting for an African American president.  I've been skeptical of those fears for some time, especially given the prevalence of people of color and women in union membership rolls, and the extraordinary job unions have done in getting their members to the polls in recent years.  I imagine that the newfound prevalence of economic issues will help Obama capture as many union votes as Kerry did, if not more, but there's really not much polling on this issue.  Kerry's benchmark is 61% of the union household vote, which comprised 24% of the electorate.  In 2006, Democrats pulled 65% of the union household vote, which was 23% of the electorate.  It'll be interesting to see where the trendlines go.
       
   
• Up-ticket support vs. down-ticket support.  It will be interesting to see how Obama performs against other Democrats up and down the ticket.  Obama is likely to underperform two early-reporting Senate victories, the Shaheen race in NH and the Warner race in Virginia.  These might establish a theme that down-ticket Democrats are helping Obama, rather than the other way around.

There is a simple way to unite all of these themes under one narrative: progressive realignment.  As Paul Rosenberg has argued for a couple of years, and as John Judis and Ruy Teixeira predicted a long time ago, this election is about the victory of a powerful progressive coalition, which will provide the backbone for a strong Democratic majority.  The coalition is composed of people of color, young voters, women, religious minorities, LGBT individuals, and union households.  Whites, particularly white males and white evangelicals, play a remarkably small role.  What's more, the primary beneficiary of this coalition (Obama) is also a great representative of it.

With the election of the country's first African American president, this will be a historic moment.  Indeed, there is more than just history being made this year, but, perhaps, history being repeated.  Despite all the comparisons of this election to those of 1980, 1996, or just about any other in recent memory, perhaps the most fitting is that of 1932.  In that year, an economic disaster solidified a coalition of demographic groups who were capable of providing a long-term popular backbone for a massive new economic program and, eventually, a new world order.

There are reasons to view this election as a sign of even greater progressive strength than that of 1932.  FDR's political accomplishment was holding together a coalition of groups - including Southern whites and Northern racial and ethnic minorities - who actually did not have a lot in common, except for an economic crisis.  Obama's coalition has much more internal cohesion, and its foundational value is diversity - whether racial, ethnic, religious, or sexual.  Indeed, even the centerpiece of Obama's economic policy - the green collar economy and health care for everyone - is ultimately about diversifying our energy portfolio and our economic base.  Obama's central campaign themes are rooted in this foundational value: unity (because we are all different, but we still have to live together) and change (away from a government that excludes many demographic groups.)  The value of diversity, ironically, is a major point of unity for the Obama coalition, and it's hard to see that value becoming less important, even after the economic crisis is solved.  While there are certainly matters of contention betwen different elements of the base (like continuing tensions between some African American religious leaders and GLBT groups, or between unions and young professionals), as a whole I think the Obama coalition is considerably more internally cohesive than the FDR coalition was.

It's important that we center the discussion of this election around this coalition, and the strong mandate for diversity and economic change it represents.  This is going to be a bit difficult, since the coalition is by its nature not as easily typified as past coalitions, with their soccer moms and NASCAR dads.  Still, I think it would be fair to characterize this coalition as "the green-collar melting pot" coalition, or something similar.  Such a characterization would not only reify a major progressive goal (the establishment of a green-collar economy), it would also move the center of politics away from the white suburban voter, and would cast the election not as a victory for Obama, but as a victory for Obama's base.

This is a subtle distinction, but an important one: it's the difference between giving Obama a blank check, and laying the groundwork for a progressive critique of an Obama administration; it's the difference between allowing Blue Dogs to hold sway in Congress, and setting up progressive Democrats in Congress as the "loyal opposition" to Obama.  Moreover, this is a distinction which already has a basis in Obama's rhetoric.  Obama has, in Dean-like fashion, consistently held up for praise his own volunteer base, throughout his campaign.  Given the widespread view that Obama is a progressive, progressives might as well stand up and own the logical conclusion: that the progressive base, the "green collar melting pot" coalition, was the powerhouse behind this landslide.

Ideally, I'd love to see progressive pundits capable of making these points forcefully and analyzing the kind of data I referred to above on-the-fly on Election Night.  My "dream team" lineup of pundits would probably include Ruy Teixeira, Van Jones, Simon Rosenberg, Nate Silver, and David Sirota.  (Silver, I believe, will be hanging out with Dan Rather that night, so at least some of these pundits will be well-situated.)  There are probably many others I'm leaving out, and I'd certainly like to hear some suggestions in the comments.

On the whole, here's what I'm wondering: Are there any themes or important data points I'm leaving up in my list above?  Does this narrative make sense, or is it entirely off?  Besides pushing this narrative in the blogosphere and trying to encourage the major news networks to choose a progressive lineup of pundits, what can we do to establish and solidify this narrative?  I'd love to hear your thoughts in the comments.