How Much Will Iowa Matter?
by Chris Bowers, Mon May 14, 2007 at 07:34:57 PM EST
Based on today's two new polls, I have revised my national poll averages. Here are the five-week trends, starting from Obama's low point on April 10th and continuing through today:
High-End Average
| Date |
Clinton |
Obama |
Edwards |
Other / Unsure |
| May 14 |
38.8 |
27.0 |
15.4 |
18.8 |
| May 11 |
38.2 |
27.8 |
15.2 |
18.8 |
| May 08 |
37.2 |
27.6 |
15.8 |
19.4 |
| May 04 |
34.0 |
28.8 |
17.8 |
19.4 |
| Apr 30 |
33.5 |
30.3 |
18.0 |
18.2 |
| Apr 27 |
35.2 |
29.8 |
18.0 |
17.0 |
| Apr 24 |
35.7 |
28.4 |
17.6 |
18.3 |
| Apr 20 |
35.7 |
28.0 |
17.2 |
19.1 |
| Apr 16 |
37.0 |
26.3 |
17.0 |
19.7 |
| Apr 13 |
37.0 |
24.5 |
17.0 |
21.5 |
| Apr 10 |
37.8 |
22.8 |
17.3 |
22.1 |
Low-end average
| Date |
Clinton |
Obama |
Edwards |
Other / Unsure |
| May 14 |
35.9 |
23.3 |
14.3 |
26.6 |
| May 11 |
34.9 |
23.4 |
13.9 |
27.9 |
| May 08 |
34.1 |
23.3 |
14.3 |
28.3 |
| May 04 |
33.3 |
24.4 |
16.3 |
26.0 |
| Apr 30 |
34.2 |
27.0 |
16.7 |
22.2 |
| Apr 27 |
34.4 |
26.4 |
16.3 |
22.9 |
| Apr 24 |
34.3 |
25.9 |
16.0 |
23.8 |
| Apr 20 |
34.0 |
25.1 |
15.0 |
25.9 |
| Apr 16 |
33.9 |
24.6 |
15.1 |
26.4 |
| Apr 13 |
34.9 |
24.0 |
15.7 |
25.4 |
| Apr 10 |
35.8 |
22.0 |
15.5 |
26.7 |
Now, as formidable as Clinton's lead appears, if the 2008 race develops along the same contours as the 2004 campaign, virtually no pre-Iowa lead is safe. According to
a chart at Pollster.com, John Kerry turned a 20-point national deficit to Dean to a 25-point national advantage in just the week from the Iowa caucus to the New Hampshire primary:
Rapid post-Iowa movement of this level would make national, pre-Iowa polls a virtually useless indicator of the state of the campaign. However, I just don't think there will be as much movement post-Iowa in 2008 as there was in 2004. Last cycle, there were a variety of factors that came together to create a perfect storm of post-Iowa momentum for Kerry. Here is an incomplete list of those factors:
- High level of familiarity with the Democratic top-tier. In late September of 2003, a Newsweek poll of a hypothetical Democratic nomination showed Al Gore and Hillary Clinton polling at a combined 61%, while the ten announced candidates polled only a combined 31%. As late as December 8th, 2003, Quinnipiac showed Hillary Clinton polling 43%, the nine announced candidates polling a combined 48%. Newsweek showed nearly identical results one week earlier, and AP-Ipsos had done the same three weeks earlier (source for polls). In other words, back in 2003, between 40% and 60% of all Democrats were ready to abandon their favorite announced candidate if another, high-profile Democrat were to enter the race. That indicates extremely soft support. By way of comparison, in 2007, when potential candidates such as Al Gore and Wesley Clark are included in national polls, at most they draw a combined 20% support. The higher level of familiarity with the Democratic top tier in 2007-2008 reduces the potential movement among the field, relative to 2003-2004. This has also been reflected in numerous polls showing the Democratic electorate much more satisfied with the current slate of candidates than they have been in recent nomination campaigns.
- "Scream" repeat unlikely. Kerry quick rise after Iowa was additionally fueled not only by his victory, but by Howard Dean's rapid decline following intense press coverage of "the scream." That was a highly unusual event that I seriously doubt will be replicated for any candidate in 2007-2008.
- Major candidates unlikely to drop out after Iowa. In 2004, Kerry's rapid post-Iowa rise was also fueled by the removal of Gephardt from the field. As the candidates with the momentum at the time, Gephardt supporters moved is massively disproportionate amounts to Kerry and Edwards. Consider, for example, that on February 3rd, 2004 ("mini-Tuesday") Kerry and Edwardshad their highest combined vote total in Missouri, Gephardt's home state. However, right now it seems that the only major candidate who would drop out after a failure in Iowa would be Edwards. Thus, Edwards would not benefit from an Iowa victory to the same degree as either Clinton or Obama would. At the same time, Clinton and Obama are less likely to win Iowa than Edwards. Overall, that makes this situation somewhat unlikely to repeat itself.
- "Electability" is less of a factor. In 2004, "electability" was the main issue for around 35-40% of the Democratic primary electorate. Early indications are that, in 2008, it will play a smaller role in determining voter choice. A recent Gallup poll, for example, suggested that "electability" is the primary motivating factor for about 10% of Clinton and Obama supporters. Nothing convinces voters that someone is more electable than actually winning, so Kerry's post-Iowa rise was again greater than what one would normally expect.
- Voters paying more attention in 2008. Democratic engagement in the 2008 primary season is much higher than in other recent cycles. As the campaign progresses, this will result in more high-information voters, and in "harder" candidate support.
- Less Media Focus on Dems in 2008. With both the Republican and Democratic parties featuring contested nomination campaigns in 2008, Democrats will not have the post-Iowa media surge all to their own this time. That could create less positive press, and thus less momentum, for whoever wins Iowa.
- No guarantee the Iowa winner will be a surprise. The established media loves to report on the "expectations" game. Another factor that helped fuel Kerry's enormous post-Iowa rise was that he had been left for dead just two months earlier, and that Dean and Gephardt had long been thought to be the most likely winners in Iowa. This time around, there is simply no guarantee that the Iowa results will shift so wildly in the final two weeks before the caucus, thus creating a more "unexpected," and thus more covered, campaign narrative.
Now, with all of that said, whoever wins Iowa will still receive some sort of momentum boost. However, this far out and with many factors to consider, it is extremely difficult to estimate just how large that boost will be. Overall, my advice is this: if you are backing someone who trails in the national polls, don't count on a Kerry-esque, post-Iowa momentum tsumani to lift your candidate to victory. Four years ago, 2004 was a perfect momentum storm, and this time around the variables have changed.
I think a good rule of thumb is to, at a minimum, either lead Iowa and be within fourteen points of the national leader, or lead New Hampshire and be within eight points of the national poll leader. Anything else will require extraordinary circumstances for the national leader to lose his or her hold on the campaign. Right now, I think that makes Clinton the clear frontrunner, even if that wasn't the case just two weeks ago. Then again, if national polls can shift this quickly in April and May, maybe we should expect another post-Iowa tsunani.
It is certainly difficult to try and figure all this stuff out. Fortunately, speculation like this it is even more fun than it is difficult.
Tags: Iowa, President 2008, President 2004, polls, media, electability, Democrats (all tags)
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