What We Need To Know About Murtha's Plan

Last week, Jack Mrutha's plan to end the war was leaked at MoveCongress.org. the next day, I wrote an approving article about it on MyDD. As I noted in that article, while I approved of the plan, I am neither a policy wonk nor terribly well informed on legislative procedure. Like many people involved in the netroots, I came into politics from a different career entirely just a few short years ago. While I have always been something of a mild activist and high-level news consumer, my training has been on the job and by the seat of my pants. What I am trying to say is that while I very much want to support this plan, right now I simply don't know enough either about its chances of passing into law or of significantly de-escalating the war.

In order to translate support for this action beyond a circle of policy wonks and into the sort of national majority and activist energy that could hopefully bring the war to an end, it is vital that we receive more information on the plan. I have five broad questions:
  1. To what extent will Murtha's plan be able to force reductions in American troop levels in Iraq? Does anyone have any figures on how many troops meet Murtha's requirements for training, unit manpower, equipment, and length of duty in Iraq? It would also be useful to know at what rate the available pool of troops would continue to decline as more and more American troops serve for longer periods in Iraq, and thus fail to meet Murtha's requirements. In other words, if Murtha's proposals passes into law, how many troops would be available, and at what rate would our military presence in Iraq decline? This isn't just important for Americans to know--Iraqis would need to know it too.

  2. Are any limitations on contractors being proposed? It seems to me that if Murtha's plan both passes into law, and if it actually succeeds in significantly reducing the available numbers of troops in Iraq, the Bush administration could still use private contractors to maintain current levels of American military presence in the country. It thus seems to me that limitations should be placed on private contractors as well as on troop readiness and safety.

  3. Are Democrats willing to go to the mat over this? Because Murtha's plan goes through the appropriations process, which must be passed, the final stage of the fight could be a governmental shut-down of sorts, ala the 1995 budget battle, except confined to defense appropriations. I believe this would take place after September 30, the end of the fiscal year, and might in fact be the route Republicans prefer. After all, they have long been arguing that Democrats intend to cut off funding for troops in the field. An immediate stoppage of funds, rather than the gradual process Murtha proposes, might just be the route Republicans want to force this debate. Thus, rather than going along with Murtha's restrictions, they could filibuster in the Senate and / or veto from the White House any defense appropriation bill that carries Murtha's restrictions with it in order to frame the debate in their desired direction. Are Democrats willing to fight this battle to make sure that Murtha's restrictions are included? What level of media and activist campaign are they willing to wage on behalf of Murtha's plan before it comes to a potential "all or nothing" showdown?

  4. Who can we expect to lose from the non-binding resolutions? The non-binding resolutions opposing escalation provided us with a list of 248 members of the House (246 yes votes plus two absent Democrats) who would potentially support Murtha's plan. Given this, are we in any danger of the bill not passing the House? Int he Senate, the cloture vote provided us with 57 potential supporters (56 yes votes and one Democratic absence). This is obviously a lot more dicey, since seven of those 57 were Republicans, and one is still very ill. Who needs to most pressure to stay on board, both at first and as the battle heats up in the face of Republican opposition via filibuster / veto? If this plan is worth fighting for, and if Democrats are ready to go to the mat over it, I want to be able to help bring the noise in the most effective way possible.

  5. Mass action in the days leading up to the supplemental funding votes? If ever there should be a day or days of mass coordinated action, it should come immediately before actual votes that have a real chance to end the war. If Murtha's plan is just that, then in the days leading up to the keys votes it should be preceded with a sweeping virtual march, several real marches, vigils, other local actions and creative media-friendly demonstrations about things like body armor. In addition to any media campaign, there should be a massive pile-on effect of protests to force a national dialogue about the upcoming votes. What is being done on this front? What can we do?
These are questions I think we all should know the answers to, because this has the potential to become the biggest legislative fight in over a decade. It is also one of the very few types of fights that would be the raison d'etre for the progressive netroots: ending the war in Iraq. Perhaps more so than nay other event over the last ten years, opposition to the war in Iraq was the main cause for explosive netroots growth and development. If there is a real chance to end the war that has a real chance of passing through Congress, albeit with a huge legislative fight, then this is exactly the sort of thing that we should be piling on like no other. That is why we need to know more about Murtha's plan. While this may be the least sexy way to end a war ever devised, the progressive netroots can serve several vital functions in this fight. We can be translators explaining to the base why this is so important. We can organizers bringing whatever activist support we can muster. We can be a media force battling the Republican Noise Machine tooth and nail, 24/7. We can do all this and more, but we need to know the plan will work, and that Democrats will stand with us.



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we need to know (soon) when votes will be (none / 0)

I've never really been one for protests, but I would protest for this. I would drive two and a half hours to DC and march in the cold all day. I would camp out on the mall for a week and tell my boss to shove it if he wouldn't give me the time off.

I guarantee a lot of other people would too, if it meant ending the war in Iraq.

We need to organize ASAP, and part of that means knowing when votes are going to be. I know it'll be a while before anyone knows, but there will come a time when Harry Reid or Nancy Pelosi make those decisions, and you, Chris, should be the first person they call.


Progress is Personal | PCCC
by msnook on Mon Feb 19, 2007 at 02:23:40 PM EST

Great stuff! (none / 0)

All excellent ideas.

I think the first document that the defense apps subcommittee produces is the Chairman's Mark - the base bill worked up by the majority staff based on the WH request, various hearings, etc, etc.

I've no idea when that is due, but, given that it has to be agreed by the subcommittee, and then by the full committee, and they want the bill on the floor in March, it can't be too long off.

I do wonder if there are freestanding drafts of the proviso floating around, though.

The idea that the lefty sphere might do its homework thoroughly before launching a legislative campaign - another first for MyDD!

Hot times ahead...


by skeptic06 on Mon Feb 19, 2007 at 03:03:43 PM EST

One small data point on Murtha's Plan (none / 0)

i was speaking with aides to a conservative Dem on United for Peace and Justice Lobby Day, Jan. 29.  I was basically told that the congressperson would follow Murtha on the Appropriations.  No one knew of this plan at the time.  but he has the respect of the members.  Rules, budgets, defense, it is all very complicated.  He understands it.  (No, I am not making fun of them or making light of it.  this stuff is complicated.  It makes sense to have a division of labor.)


by lawyerDan on Mon Feb 19, 2007 at 11:29:29 PM EST

Troop Levels (none / 0)

Chris --- sorry for getting into this thread late --- one of my hobby horses has been following troop deployments, rotations and reconstitution cycles since at least August, 2003.  I am only using public sources so I will be wrong, but I think my margin of error is fairly small.  

Right now the Bush escalation plan is to put 20 brigades into Iraq by mid-May, and 2 brigades into Afghanistan.  Right now the Iraq force is designed to be 18 active duty brigades, and the two in Afganistan are also active duty brigades.  The National Guard as a whole will not be available in sufficient numbers until the very end of this year or the first quarter of 2008.  Between the US Army and the US Marines, there are a planned fifty active duty brigades/regiments, so twenty brigades is 40% of the force.  

However the entire force is not deployable right now. There are at least six Army brigades forming up/reorganizing, and another brigade in South Korea unavailable for deployment, so we are down to 20 out of 43.  Of the remaing 23 brigades, at least sixteen of them have rotated out of Iraq or Afghanistan in the past 8 months.  These units are nowhere near ready for deployment.  The remaining seven brigades have rotated out of combat from 8 to 18 months ago.  These brigades would be the first ones effected by Murtha, and my guess, repeat guess, is that none of these units have adequate training time on the right equipment.  All the current reporting is stating that the brigades not in combat theatres are at C-3 or C-4 readiness, which is the two lowest levels of combat readiness.

Of the five brigades going forward into Iraq for the escalation, two brigades of the 3rd Infantry Division had between 12 and 14 months of rest between deployments.  These two brigades at the very least will not meet the Murtha training/readiness requirements.  The other three brigades are very questionable.  Additionally, one brigade of the Minn. National Guard saw its tour extended by 3.5 months, and one Marine regiment equivalant is having its tour extended by 2 months.

So if the Murtha requirements were in place this afternoon, the maximum sustainable force in Iraq is most likely 10 or 11 brigades.  The number of eligible brigades will decrease in the next six to nine months, and then slowly start increasing again to a max of 18-20 active duty brigades eligible.


by fester on Tue Feb 20, 2007 at 03:40:37 PM EST


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