Ok, like Chris, I've never waded into the Hackett-Brown fight, but this move by Hackett is something that demands comment. I have no dog in this fight; I've given twice to Hackett, but I have friends working for Brown and I consider his work in the House genuinely progressive. I know little about Ohio politics, though what I do know suggests that Brown is probably relying a bit too much on a very dysfunctional Ohio party to do field. First, though, read what Chris wrote.
What happened here strikes me as a bit of puffery. As far as I can tell, Paul Hackett was going to lose this primary. It was always clear that Brown led by a huge amount in name ID, and Ohio, with lots of media markets, is not a state where you can overcome these handicaps without a lot of money. Hackett didn't have this money, and he wasn't going to get it. His campaign was in disarray, and his inexperience as a candidate showed in his sloppy messaging. At the same time, the existing political establishment was predicting a loss for Hackett, and suggesting that channels of money and support not engage his candidacy. And if your gauge is political victory, they were right.
So what's the exit strategy for Hackett? Let's do a thought experiment, and put yourself in Hackett's place. One way to get through this would be to let the voters decide. In all likelihood, Hackett would get crunched in the primary, and that would destroy the myth of Paul Hackett, supercandidate. He could have won, but that was unlikely. Another way to go out would have been to drop out, endorse Brown, and run for the OH-02 Congressional seat. Now, with a perfect storm, Hackett couldn't win this seat, and in 2006, turnout among Republicans would be higher than it was in a special election in 2005. So if Hackett ran and lost, that would make him a thrice-loser. Another path would have been to drop out, endorse Brown, and run for a statewide office in 2008. That would have required a lot of politicking from now until 2008, something I imagine Hackett doesn't like doing.
Then there's what he actually did. Rather than putting his candidacy to the voters, Hackett blamed party leaders for his campaign, and claimed a betrayal similar to that of being sent to Iraq and reinforced the idea that Democrats are against veterans. All of this was rational behavior - now Hackett doesn't have to face the voters, and he can take revenge on Brown for reneging on his promise not to run.
And from the party leadership standpoint, what they did was also rational. Donors asked them if they should give to Hackett, and behind the scenes they looked at the vote counts and said 'no, Hackett's going to lose.' Donors look to them for this kind of information, and if they are wrong their crediblity suffers.
Now, there are a couple of lessons to take away from this episode.
1) We need more and better organization. Without the ability to give someone like Hackett more than some internet buzz, the netroots cannot boost someone into high elected office. That means we have to increase our political apparatus.
2) Establishment Democrats are still more powerful than we are, by orders of magnitude. While we can put tens of thousands into a race, they can dwarf that with millions.
3) We need netroots candidates. Hackett wasn't a netroots guy - he had never heard of blogs until Tim Tagaris and others delivered huge amounts of cash to his doorstep. And he didn't have the experience to handle the Ohio political scene with the gravitas necessary to become a Senator. Until these candidates emerge (and they are emerging), we have to work with political candidates who have one foot in the old world and one in the new world.
4) We need to put pressure on the establishment in systematic, effective ways. If you are angry at Schumer or Reid, and I have had issues with both at various times, it doesn't matter unless you can figure out a way to make them feel it. We haven't figured out how to make them feel it yet, because their political survival and success is based on factors that we haven't impacted yet (local media and big dollar donors).
5) Finally, this is the most important piece. Don't follow Paul Hackett's example. Be smart, be strategic, and put pressure where it works. Don't bite off more than you can chew, and do not drop out of politics. Fight professionally, fight aggressively, and fight like it matters, because it does. But don't pretend, as Hackett did, like you don't have responsibility for your own actions and that it's some big evil system out there putting you down. Yes, that system exists, and yes, it sucks, but that means that you have to go into politics with an understanding that you are facing entrenched people who are going to fight you tooth and nail. Hackett is pretending somehow that he shouldn't have had to fight for power. Maybe that's true, maybe it's not, but it's fundamentally a naive worldview that you should not emulate.
In politics, we will fight and we will lose elections, and we will keep losing, until one day, we win. That's what an intraparty struggle means; we have to just take power against savvy insiders. Meanwhile, we are gaining power, making progress every day, with fights against Ford, Microsoft, Chris Matthews, the Washington Post, Henry Cuellar, Joe Lieberman, and Dick Cheney. We matter. We are winning this in the long-term. Don't let hero-worship get in the way of that fundamental point.
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