With Democrats potentially ceding control over the Senate with the loss of just a single seat -- whether as a result of a defection, a resignation, an expulsion or, God forbid, a death -- there has been some discussion that the Republicans should hold out for concessions in the agreement organizing the Senate, specifically ensuring that should the composition of the Senate change during the course of the 110th Congress to create a Republican majority (with the tie-breaking vote of Vice President Cheney) that the Republicans would be able to take over the responsibilities and powers generally afforded to the majority. As precedent, the resolution organizing the Senate in 2001 is often cited. Charles Babington has the details on page one of Friday's issue of The Washington Post.

In 2001, Republicans controlled a 50-50 Senate, thanks to Cheney's tie-breaking authority. The chamber suddenly shifted to Democratic control when Sen. James M. Jeffords (Vt.) left the GOP and caucused with Democrats.

Republicans might have managed to thwart the power shift had they not agreed earlier to an organizing resolution granting majority privileges to Democrats if they achieved a numerical advantage. Without that agreement, Republicans might have been able to filibuster or otherwise block Democrats' efforts to reorganize the chamber in their favor.

Daschle negotiated the 2001 deal for his party. Asked if GOP leaders are likely to seek similar language in the next Senate's organizing resolution, Daschle said via e-mail that "it is reasonable to expect that the precedents we set in '00 and '01 will serve as a guide in '07."

To provide more context, which this article is lacking to an extent, Babington leaves out an important aspect the 107th Congress, during which the resolution cited by Sen. Daschle was reached, that is notably missing from the 110th Congress. During the 2000 election cycle, Democrats picked up enough seats in the United States Senate to force a 50-50 tie with Republicans in the chamber. As a result, when Congress organized on January 3, 2001, the Senate was under Democratic control as then-Vice President Al Gore -- who would remain in that position for 17 more days until the inauguration of the next administration -- cast the tie-breaking vote in his own party's favor. Though likely politically untenable, the Democrats could have attempted to hold on to control over the Senate even after the Republican Vice President, Dick Cheney, was sworn in. True, the Republicans would have likely filibustered and generally worked to shut down the chamber in response. But the Democrats did have precedent for maintaining control over the chamber even while technically being in the minority. Babington and Jonathan Weisman explain in another article in the Thursday issue of The Post.

A different scenario unfolded in 1954, after the deaths and replacements of several senators over two years. Republicans remained the majority party even though Democrats eventually outnumbered them, 48 to 47, with one independent. Democratic leader Lyndon B. Johnson did not challenge the GOP's control, in part, historians said, because the independent, Wayne L. Morse of Oregon, warned that he would caucus with the Republicans if need be. That would have led to a 48-48 chamber, and Vice President Richard M. Nixon would have broken the tie in Republicans' favor.

As a result of Democrats' control of the Senate for the first two plus weeks of the 107th Congress and their ability to at least attempt to continue in that position, Senate Republicans, under their then-leader Trent Lott, had no choice but to accept the Democrats demand to temporarily alter tradition by writing into the Senate's organizing resolution that control over the chamber would switch should the Democrats somehow gain another seat.

This is far from the case today, however. Barring a change in the makeup of the Senate before the first week of January, the Democrats will be in control of the chamber from day one of the session and thus Republicans will have no claim whatsoever to preferential treatment. Although Republicans could try to mount an unprecedented power grab by slowing down the Senate or even refusing to agree on an organizing resolution, they understand that such a move would not only be seen as improper by voters, who sent a rather clear message that they did not want to see Republicans in control of either branch of Congress anymore, but also as rather distasteful given the unfortunate events of this week. As such, both Democrats and Republicans understand that the GOP leadership in the Senate does not have the leverage to demand such concessions from the Democratic leadership.

The implications of this reality are important, not only as a result of the excessive and premature speculation by many this week that the Democrats would not be in control over the Senate during the next Congress but also because of the potential that a member of the Senate who intends to caucus with the Democrats might later change his or her mind over the course of the next two years. Should said member decide to caucus with the Republicans after the first week of January, the absence of the aforementioned special concession in the Senate's organizing resolution would mean that the Democrats could remain in control of the chamber -- even as Republicans would technically have the majority with the tie-breaking vote of the Vice President.

So the Democrats must not follow the suggestions of Tom Daschle by using "the precedents we set in '00 and '01 [...] as a guide in '07" but should instead follow the longer-standing and more pertinent traditions of the Senate by crafting an organizing resolution that fully protects their rights as the majority in the Senate.