1. When he appeared before the committee in September 2002, he stated his belief that force should be used as a last resort, only after all diplomatic actions had been exhausted. Because these steps were not fully achieved, America lacks legitimacy in the region. As a result of this lack of legitimacy -- which is also based in part on a poorly implemented de-Ba'athification, a lack of security in the country, and the failure to reconstruct parts of the Iraqi infrastructure -- we "emotionally empowered the insurgency."
   
2. In September 2002, the army claimed that it would only need 75,000 troops in the country. Today, there are seventeen brigades on the ground (out of the 33 active duty brigades available. As a result, the situation is not sustainable. To get out the right way, three tool kits must be implemented. They are:
   
   • An effective military: It is extremely important to be effective in training the Iraqis. Right now, we are not resourced for that.
     
   • Political: Paul Bremer was completely ineffective, and thought Ambassador Negroponte got an election, he will be leaving soon. [At this point, I was briefly bumped off of the line]
     
   • Diplomatic: [I was still off the line for most of this bullet point]
3. This is the first time that the all-volunteer army has been in sustained action. Already, the effects on the troops can be seen, and there has been an "incalculable consequence for their families."
   We need a larger active duty force. This will cost significantly more money, but that money has not yet come. As a result, we are "overextended and off balance."

In a somewhat rambling way, I noted to the General that he seemed to be taking a larger role in Democratic politics in the past few weeks (with the re-launch of his website, his mass email and blogad campaign on FCC restrictions, etc., though I didn't mention them at the time) and asked him if this foreshadows something to come in 2006 or 2008.

The General replied that I had worded my question in an interesting way (I suppose I had) because he had never stopped campaigning for John Kerry ("I've never stopped being active"). Though he reiterated his commitment to forwarding and improving the Democratic Party -- to make it "know enough" and be "strong enough" to defend the American people -- he gently neglected to answer my question. (He's clearly much more adept at navigating such questions than he was in September 2003.)

Armando jumped in next and asked if the Iraqi election meant anything. Clark responded that though "the administration has taken advantage of the election," Sunni participation was low (as Armando noted in his question). As a result, the election has not yet brought the country together.

Juan Cole followed up with an extremely interesting question (I will not even attempt to reword it) inquiring as to how we get a soft landing in Iraq. General Clark explained that we need to bring in Arab troops from Gulf states and train more Iraqi troops so we can begin to decrease American participation. This presupposes the legitimacy of the Iraqi government, which will be contingent on politics on the ground and diplomacy in the region.

A larger question surrounding American involvement in Iraq that must be answered is if the American presence in Iraq will lead to (or rather is a result of) the larger US involvement in the region. The President laid out a plan to the American Enterprise Institute for reshaping the Middle East along the lines of policies created by Douglas Feith, Richard Perle and others for Benjamin Netanyahu. The plan entailed Syrian withdrawal from Lebanon and regime change in Syria and Iran. Teheran "sees what's coming," so they have a vested interest in aligning with Syria. As a result, right now we're not moving "towards a soft landing but a deeper, quixotic involvement in the region.

Armando brought up the recent attack on Abu Ghraib and asked General Clark what to make of the Zarqawi attack. Clark noted that it is relatively unguarded and has been attacked before. He then explained that the attack was Zarqawi's attempt to gain legitimacy in the country by attacking the symbol of American hubris. (Hubris is my word. I can't remember exactly how Clark put it, but it was something to that effect.) Unlike the case in Vietnam, he said, there's no chance for the Iraqis to keep up with superior American strength. As a result, the situation will remain relatively static: suicide attacks and guerilla tactics.

[Armando followed up in asking about the advisory role for the Americans in the future (something Clark referenced in his previous answer). I apparently did not take coherent notes on the answer.]

I jumped into the conversation with another meandering question on oil. Many in the administration predicted that Iraqi oil revenue would support rebuilding of the country so that American costs would not be more than $1-2 billion. As we've seen, though the Iraqi oil infrastructure is no where near being rebuilt entirely. In related news, oil prices hit a new high of $58 per barrel. I finished this rant by asking how we can get Iraqi oil production up and running again for us, and more importantly, the Iraqis.

Clark noted that even at the end of Saddam's regime, the infrastructure was getting old, so there were preexistring problems with the pipelines. That having been said, the pipelines are being attacked because it's easy. There's no shortcut to protecting the oil lines aside from securing the country as a whole. There simply aren't enough troops, and even if there were one million troops defending the pipelines, insurgents would be able to break through. Nevertheless, the low production level in Iraq has less to do with the price than the rapidly increasing demand, particularly from China and India. Unless the supply begins to grow more rapidly than demand, the price will continue to increase.

Juan Cole -- much more of an expert on oil and Iraq than I will ever be --followed up by noting that $10-15 of the price of each barrel comes from security concerns in the region (thanks for explicating my question!). He then commented that the pipelines weren't safe during the Saddam period because insurgents didn't want to attack them but rather because the tribes protected them (as a result of bribes and other tactics by the Ba'athists). When the pipelines are attacked today, it shows the complicity of the tribes in the insurgency, in effect proof that the guerilla war is not winding down.

Clark replied, "I don't think you can tell if you're winning this or the attacks are down" for unrelated reasons. He then brought up his bullet points on how to fix the situation before opining, "If there's a way out -- if there's a way -- this is it."

Armando got the last question of the morning. He asked what are the risks of misreading whether we're winning or if the insurgents are merely laying low. Clark first stepped back and reminded us that he's not over there (so he is not seeing the latest data and reports). Nevertheless, he explained that there are three risks:

1. Staying there and overstaying your welcome. America could become ineffective and eventually be thrown out by the government.
   
2. Pulling out too soon. This could lead to a civil war, thus requiring America to step back in.
   
3. The risk to the all-volunteer army. If the Armed Forces become discredited (as they were following Vietnam), much work will have to go into rebuilding the army. Part of the problem is that American involvement in Iraq had never solely been about Iraq. This makes the soldiers' job harder.