How Democrats Can Seize The New Civic Space

Despite the nearly three-fold increase on money spent in the 2004 Presidential election cycle versus the 2000 Presidential election cycle, voter participation only increased from 55.3% of the voting eligible population to 60.7% of the voting eligible population. Further, despite the increase in applied resources, fewer people than ever changed their minds during the course of the campaign. What went wrong? Why did both parties receive such small returns on such enormous investments?

As intense and massive as our voter contact drives were during 2004, and as often as we have discussed their successes and failures of such operations, I am slowly coming to believe that the main reason for the diminishing returns of large political investments is the inability of political campaigns to properly adjust to the way civic engagement itself has changed. Specifically, individual engagement in the public sphere is now driven primarily by small, self-starting, disparate collectives rather than by participation within large, centralized, mass membership, civic organizations. Despite this shift, more often than not we simply apply the new resources we have toward replicating older models of political influence through voter contact structures that no longer match the way individuals connect to the public sphere. The wave of new activists who became interested and engaged in the political process through small, self-starting collectives were turned into old-school representatives of large, centralized organizations contacting voters on behalf of those organizations and delivering a centralized plan and message developed by those organizations. The wave of new money collected form small donors was used to make even larger television ad buys than ever before, even though everyone knows such ad buys are becoming less effective by the day. In other words, we took people we became interested in the political process through the new public sphere and directed them to engage in the very activities that had been so ineffective in reaching them for the past few decades because they were created to meet the realities of a public sphere that no longer exists.

Why were we encouraging people who never swallowed a single political TV ad to donate money to run political TV ads? Why were we encouraging people who never trusted canvassers to become canvassers themselves? The failure of the Perfect Storm in Iowa attests to how ineffective this was. Instead of having the activists new to the process replicate the models of voter contact that did not bring them into the process and even turned them off to the process, shouldn't we have them replicate the models of voter contact that actually brought them into the process?

Any new organizing model for the Democratic Party has to take into account the realities of the changing public sphere in order to be effective. This will require new models of voter contact, and it will require being open source. A very recent paper by Marty Kearnes, who has been working on progressive techno-politics since I was in elementary school, echoes this sentiment:

Option 3 accepts that in future elections people do not organize around membership organizations, wards, churches, political bosses or institutions. Modern day organizing or political advocacy is activated through more loosely connected community listserves, technology wired affinity groups, activity coordinating groups, fan clubs, etc. The challenge to the party is not to bring folks back into outdated civic institutions. The goal is to spread organizing via people into the self-forming associations enabled and sustained by technology.

The party needs to aggressively experiment with alternative channels to reach the public including music, arts, poetry, story telling, cultural events, video games and service work. The party needs to invest in new technologies to pipe messages out including email, innovative blog networks, websites, online broadcasting, podcast, cell phones, rdif applications for organizing and voice over Internet technologies. The Democrats should develop networks to the communities of innovation to keep the party strategists and trainers knowledgeable of emerging technology and the ways to experiment with new technology in campaign context. The party becomes a vehicle for spreading advantage quickly rather than simply purchasing services from a vendor and leaving it to the vendor to spread innovation.

Our solutions to improving voter contact cannot repeatedly be to replicate what we have done in the past on a larger and more coordinated scale (basically, what we did in 2004). Our current methods of voter contact are not influencing many voters, are not helping us in partisan self-identification, and are not helping us in ideological self-identification. As time goes on, these methods will only become even less effective. As a result of the changes in the public sphere, we need to find new means of voter contact that address our new reality. The only way that is going to happen if the party moves away from mass-membership, institutional based campaigns which do not reflect how people live and participate in political discourse, and toward a much greater focus on campaigns that are driven by individuals who hold influential positions within small social groups. This is neither strategic, choosing one plan over another, nor moral, choosing one value over another. Instead, this is ontological, recognizing that one reality has replaced another. For a detailed proposal on how to proceed in the new reality, I have reproduced Karnes's entire paper in the extended entry.

This paper has no online link that I know of.
Situational Appraisal

The shift to a minority power status for the Democratic party will continue to have huge side effects that will further accelerate power imbalance in elections. In the short-term, the public interest movement and the Democrats can not expect parity in fundraising, media exposure, infrastructure development or access to voters. We must acknowledge the trouncing received on election days 2002 & 2004. The reality needs to set in and force us to organize a different strategy as a minority opposition.

While some leaders take comfort in the small margins that the Democrats continue to lose elections by, the faithful need to only be reminded of the John Fitzgerald Kennedy joke at the Gridiron Dinner "Don't buy a single vote more than necessary. I'll be damned if I'm going to pay for a landslide." Republicans are winning by exactly one or two percent. This is not a sign of Democratic strength but as Republican efficiency. Elections are winner take all systems.

The current position of the party is not merely a reflection of a particular candidate but the continued slide along a losing trajectory. In 1992, Democrats controlled a majority of state level and local offices, a majority of the Governorships, the House, the Senate and White House.1 Since 1992, the Democrats have cumulatively lost power across every level of government. Republicans have fractionalized the progressive base and made in roads with populations that traditionally supported progressive agendas.

The GOP is different than the party operation Democrats have struggled with for the last 40 years. The Republicans strategy and infrastructure development was built out before 1992 and their strategy has been in motion for decades.2 The 2004 election is the first example of a new Republican dominance at every level of political struggle.

The Democratic party needs a new strategy to fight this reconstituted conservative base and Republican machine. Much of the current leadership in the party, nonprofit, consulting and foundation circles lack the vision and perspective needed to retake the reigns of government. Traditional leaders have mentally, operationally and financially entrenched to defend a strategy that does not work. They are drawing from an experience that is only marginally relevant to the current situation.

The sole reliance on paid TV spots and media events to spread core messages coupled with a policy agenda of election cycle perks and plans has failed. A field operation based on stale voter engagement models, political machine era views of volunteers and haphazardly assembled alliances of nonprofits and other entities (527s, PACs) has failed. Our grassroots infrastructure is outdated. The party does not have a winning outreach and engagement strategy.

The party needs a strategy which leverages past investments while looking ahead to compete in society shaped by new industries, cheap travel, new media and a dense set of communications technologies. The new strategy must better position the Democrats to organize a majority into the future while helping defend past accomplishments. The strategy must break down walls dividing people and resources that should be working together. The strategy must remove the barriers that deter self-organization.

Objectives
A new strategy for the party should:

  • Help Democratic ideas, policy and platforms get adapted and implemented.
  • Defeat efforts by Republicans to implement a conservative and misguided agenda.
  • Help the party win elected offices at every level.
  • Improve the speed of responses to political opportunities and threats.
  • Improve cross group collaboration to enhance the effectiveness of Democratic campaigns and issue politicking.
  • Expand Democratic influence on the cultural landscape.
  • Reduce the costs of defending past political gains.
  • Expand the set of resources and political capital that are available for implementing the party platform into the future
. Measures of Success
Progress toward the objectives must be meticulously measured to monitor progress and identify areas for additional work. Measures for implementing the strategy will be:
  • The improvement in the numbers of activists responses generated to pressure targets of a campaign.
  • An increase of attendance at events organized, expanded numbers of events completed and funds raised
  • An increase in the diversity of groups engaged in organizing and implementing pressure campaigns tied to Democratic agenda.
  • An increase in the number of interactions across organizations and subgroups of the Democratic movement.
  • Observing deep and sustained shift in polling results toward determined Democratic values.
  • Change in polling numbers of those who see it as their personal responsibility to expand freedoms and opportunities for others.
  • Expanding the number of people that see the government as an appropriate mechanism to implement solutions to the country's problems including addressing lack of health care, establishing fair labor practices and preservation of our natural and historic inheritance.
  • Increase in the number of people that self-identify as Democrats and liberal.
  • Measurable increase in the key net resources (people, financial capital, political capital, hardware, software and organizing and communications infrastructure) available for future campaigns to support candidates at local, state and national levels.
  • Lower barriers to the rapid movement of campaign resources on demand.
  • Higher quality and increase diversity of candidates running for office.
  • Increased number of elected office served by Democrats
. Return on Investment
The value that the party and party leadership will derive from the successful implementation of this strategy will include but not be limited to:
  • Increased success on Election Day.
  • Reduced overhead costs for organizing campaigns.
  • Increased use of resources invested in communications, training and leadership development.
  • Accelerated capacity to deploy resources according to threats and opportunities.
  • Reduced costs to allied issue groups (lots of nonprofits get a bit smaller) by shrinking the capacity each needs to "carry" in periods of low demand.
  • A diverse leadership and actively engaged public generating more high quality candidates thereby helping the party be more effective in more races while simultaneously making the races cheaper to compete.
  • Reduction in attrition rates and staff turnover across the party and allied public interest sector.
  • Increased volunteer contributions and an increased capacity to identify "engagers" sooner.
  • Increased interest in the Democratic Party by candidates and potential candidates.
Methodology and Options
The heart of the new strategy comes from applying the lessons learned from cutting edge logistics management, computer networking and network-centric warfare concepts to the field of political organizing and advocacy (so called network-centric advocacy).

Today's attention spans and political cycles are tighter than ever. Public interest in a story spikes and fades in a day or weeks not months and years. It is essential to build a powerful rapid defense network and identify a diverse and distributed collection of people and tools that are prepared to engage on any issue at a moment's notice. The issues will be picked based on debates and events which provide communications and framing "beachheads" into the national policy agenda (discovery of cancer clusters, treatment of veterans, health care failure, treatment of military families).

The goal of a rapid response network is to decentralize the exertion of political will enabling Democrats to come at the Republican opposition from many different angles while also blinding the Republicans to the weaknesses and strengths of organizing resources dedicated to various issue areas.

A comprehensive rapid-response defense network should encompass a flexible and redundant list of hundreds of names with expertise in field operations, communications strategy, fundraising, advance work, legal credentials & expertise, campaign management, leadership skills, debriefing and evaluation training, computer and technical skills. The rapid defense network should have staff monitoring availability of the potential participants including costs and reputations. The rapid response network could enlist teams of more seasoned political operatives to work with the participants to debrief, evaluate, document, train and coach the core wave of participants.

Examples of past rapid response networks on a smaller scale include: the 1992 Clinton war room3 team focused on responding in the same newscycle to all the steps in Bush 1 took during the campaign or the National Cattleman Association's management of the Mad Cow disease discovery in late 2003.

Option 1 consists of building the rapid response network including the logistical support to deploy campaign resources staff, hardware, peoplepower and expertise into an "on demand" management plan. The initial steps include setting up a communication channel, building new flexible lend lease arrangements across organizations and staff, encouraging donors to give to more flexible groups, designing legal agreements, investing in new management of all the intellectual property (software and data) so that they can be used and controlled by multiple interest groups, campaigns and allied efforts.

The new network style of campaigning may also give rise to the need to develop intelligent hibernate and wake strategies. Staff and others will need to design entire campaigns around the concept that next week 500 professional volunteers maybe working on a campaign and in a month after the issue fades the network may be moved on to a new campaign and as well as intelligent "retreat" specialists and close out plans for campaigns. Planning campaigns and managing operations in this new environment will also take new skills training.

Four more years of the Bush administrations control over the budgets and agencies are going to reshape much of the federal government. Increasingly campaigns are going to be pitted by both parties aimed at the government itself. It is essential to recognize that there are many employees that joined agencies when the mission was quite different from the current directions advocated by Republicans. EPA, OSHA, NIH, FDA to name a few have all been recently begun to twist from serving the public to protecting the industries.

Option 2 consists of Option 1 plus investing in a protection from within strategy to shore up the those people working on behalf of the public interests from within the current branches of government (agency staff, civil servants, Judges, whistleblowers, etc.) A plan is developed to protect our friends embedded in the government from being painted as the enemy even as we fight the new directions of the agencies. The protection from within work includes establishing networks of identified allies, providing them with mentoring, ethics and moral support in the face of directions that are counter productive to the original agency goals. We must protect good staff from the pressure that will be exerted by radical right political appointees.

While a Rapid Response Network and an organized network of supporters within the agencies will increase the ability to head off the Republican shenanigans and mobilize the current assets more effectively, neither step fundamentally readjusts Democratic organizing strategy for the new age of connectivity. The methods that people use to connect and organize are changing. The culture and very nature of civic relationships are changing. The Democratic party must decide to leap out ahead of the Republican strategies to reach out and politick within the new culture.

Option 3 consist of implementing Option 1 & 2 and adding an aggressive set of programs out that focus on reshaping the discourse and modes of engaging of the public. Option 3 accepts that in future elections people do not organize around membership organizations, wards, churches, political bosses or institutions. Modern day organizing or political advocacy is activated through more loosely connected community listserves, technology wired affinity groups, activity coordinating groups, fan clubs, etc. The challenge to the party is not to bring folks back into outdated civic institutions. The goal is to spread organizing via people into the self-forming associations enabled and sustained by technology.

The party needs to aggressively experiment with alternative channels to reach the public including music, arts, poetry, story telling, cultural events, video games and service work. The party needs to invest in new technologies to pipe messages out including email, innovative blog networks, websites, online broadcasting, podcast, cell phones, rdif applications for organizing and voice over Internet technologies. The Democrats should develop networks to the communities of innovation to keep the party strategists and trainers knowledgeable of emerging technology and the ways to experiment with new technology in campaign context. The party becomes a vehicle for spreading advantage quickly rather than simply purchasing services from a vendor and leaving it to the vendor to spread innovation.

Timetable
As with any project, the proposed network-centric advocacy strategy for the party is confined by the time, money and scope restraints. It is generally only possible to pick 2 elements. However, given the grassroots capacity to inject funding into the Democratic party and support Governor Dean exerts it is fair to focus on time and scope. A rough timeline based on implementing all three options would look like:

Months 1- 5 2005

  • Establish network-centric advisory council and provide staff support in each of the departments and key Democratic institutions.
  • Expand the design specifications for the Rapid Response Network communications channel. Issue the RFP and begin the deployment.
  • Engage logistics and supply chain management experts into strategy design for campaign tool management.
  • Identify legal and financial constraints and develop a draft counter strategy to be vetted by legal and accounting teams.
  • Inventory all key intellectual property, data and vendor contracts. Engage Creative Commons team in proposing new management regime.
  • Design promotion and collateral materials to sell network concepts to broader party and allied issue groups.
  • Identify new network style of campaign leaders.
  • Convene federal and ex-federal agency staff, state staff and local staff with key labor organizers and strategists to design all elements of the protection form within strategy.
  • Begin building key databases and social network maps.
  • Establish innovation feedback program
  • Hold national "book club" recommendations competition include movies, DVDs. Music and poetry.
  • Recruit organizers to debrief on the 2004 cycle form all aspects of the campaign including volunteer analysis.
Months 5-12, 2005
  • Seed the Rapid Response Network communications channel in initial campaigns.
  • Begin to test the "lend-lease" program.
  • Begin to offer key tools and intellectual property to campaigns at all scales.
  • Begin training staff and volunteers to "train the trainers" around the country.
  • Begin to expand the participation in the shared capacity programs across party organizations and a handful of nonprofit organizations.
  • Launch the Protection from Within Network.
  • Examine first round of social network maps and begin to find ways to build network strength and efficiency.
  • Expand access and training on key databases and tools.
  • Begin monthly culture engagement with movie houses, house parties, book clubs, concerts, etc.
2006
  • Use the network infrastructure to engage Democratic skills and base resources in a dynamic "live" basis in key election efforts.
  • Begin to deploy campaign strategies designed to fully use the Democratic Network.
  • Launch the campaign alumni association.
  • Accelerate the self-learning loops enabled by the network infrastructure.
Conclusion
The future of the Democratic party rests in the power of the vision and ideas pushed by candidates and implemented by our public servants. The ability to distribute and implement the vision rests in the capacity of the infrastructure the party builds to win elections. There are many questions about the future of the party: Who is in charge? What legislation and messages might sell in the short term? This plan does not address those questions but instead starts to present options to build the participatory infrastructure to support new leadership. The plan also presents some options for immediate action given the current climate.

Families and friends of local candidates, farmers, firemen, business groups, the AFL-CIO, AARP, bloggers, Sierra Club, the sick, the poor, the elderly, the students, hunters, social workers and anyone who is looking for a way to help our cause are all a part of the Democratic movement. The Democratic agenda is tied to the coalition that participates in shaping society. Democratic Party success is tied directly to capacity of these citizens to stay informed, speak out, organize and connect their efforts to each other and back into the elected officials that can help engage government in working with them to solve problems.

This plan seeks to strategically build that network capacity over organizational interest. The plan leverages the decentralized and broad coalition of people that make up the country and in the process unite a new Democratic majority.

There is a healthy and strong network of people and groups working together to protect the Democratic agenda. Unfortunately, current campaigns and the party management have not had a network-centric strategy. Such a strategy would leverage the network's strengths and serve as a catalyst for the Democratic movement.

It is time to start focusing on the connectivity (ability to transfer workload) across our allied movement and begin to strategically build the legal, communications, technical, financial and political pipelines that are needed to moving Democrats from minority to majority power status.



Display:


interesting (none / 0)

I have a diverse set of responses.  1) is anyone in the party taking these ideas seriously, seriously enugh to start implementing them?  2) who is overseeing and evaluating the progress made or not made twoards achieving these goals? 3) are the strategies described in the article suitable to reach less technological savvy Democrats?  I fear that the Democrats, by uncritically embracing all of the suggestions, might make the same mistake as US intelligence agencies, i.e., overlook the value of human contacts; 4) how should these stragey build on the Rapid Response Network?

Shameless promotion: Take back national discourse

 www.rapidresponsenetwork.org

and

www.nomandate.org

by KDMfromPhila on Mon Feb 21, 2005 at 06:47:38 PM EST

Re: interesting (none / 0)

I don't know if anyone else is taking them "serious".  However, after the last two elections I am not feeling like "assuming"  somebody else will get it and do something.

Our challenge is to lay out a plan, kick it around, and do it.

It's our country. We are doing it. We don't need approval from anybody to push and promote good ideas.

by MartyKearns on Fri Feb 25, 2005 at 12:27:57 AM EST
[ Parent ]

Isn't part of the problem (none / 0)

how easy it is to burn people out concerning politics.  It's a lot easier to go negative and make everyone believe that all politicians suck (and politically interested folks are pushy geeks) than it is to inspire people.  

I was amazed at how negative the GOP advetising was last cycle.  Not just club for growth and the swift boat veterans.  90% of Bush ads were attack ads and lots of two bit congresman in the south decided to attack Dean in October.  I think a lot of it was aimed at making people think there was no good solution and there was no real reason to vote.  

by Lystrosaurus on Mon Feb 21, 2005 at 07:21:45 PM EST

Re: Isn't part of the problem (none / 0)

>>I was amazed at how negative the GOP advertising was last cycle.  Not just club for growth and the swift boat veterans.  90% of Bush ads were attack ads and lots of two bit congressmen in the south decided to attack Dean in October.  I think a lot of it was aimed at making people think there was no good solution and there was no real reason to vote.<<<

Negative ads work. They work because people have a general feel that politician are power mongers not servants trying to solve problems for a community, family or country.  

If we want to build loyalty that is not swayed so easily by ads and media campaigns we need to learn to use the party as a tool to solve problems for people. The parties only seem to talk policy and show up around election time.  A party that organized more service days, more listening days and solved more down and dirty details for people is a party that wins.  

We are putting to much faith in swaying people with policy talk and TV ads when we should go back to our roots and help people find jobs, feed the poor in their community, etc.

Irish Democrats (many immigrant groups) remember a party that built multi-generational loyalty because the machine helped in a very personal way, face to face politics.  

New technology and transparency empowered by a network strategy will help the party rebuild the good parts about that system designing out the boss corruption to the max extent possible.  

by MartyKearns on Fri Feb 25, 2005 at 12:41:51 AM EST
[ Parent ]

Re: Face-to-face or New Model? Much confusion! (none / 0)

It's both, that was the Republican conclusion; although volunteer face-to-face works best.
by Jerome Armstrong on Mon Feb 21, 2005 at 07:24:56 PM EST

How does information travel? (none / 0)

Great, thought provoking post. The idea that society is organized differently now occured to me during the campaign. Aside from the new strategies mentioned above, even traditional organizing and advertizing, which will probably not be completely abandoned any time soon, can benefit from strategic adjustments.
  We were discussing the fact that we, in a fairly solid blue state, weren't seeing many Kerry ads.
"O.K., I guess they know what they are doing, they have to target ad buys in swing states", we concluded.
Then I started thinking about it some more. Who's to say that an ad buy in a non-swing state can't have a ripple effect across the country? Why shouldn't our party also run ads in the reddest of states, so that people know that we exist, that we don't have horns and a tail? If people are connecting to each other in different ways, non-local networks in cyberspace, etc., it seems that saturating one market at a time is short-term and short-sighted.
Building the brand over the long haul means spreading the message where it may not help you this election cycle. I'm not a pollster, statistician, chaos theorist, or market researcher, and I'm sure these ideas have already been explored, but thanks for letting me spout.
by crackpot on Mon Feb 21, 2005 at 07:31:46 PM EST

Here's what I would do (none / 0)

I would hire 50 hackers employed with the DNC, 10 in each new regional HQ's, and 10 operating out of DC. They would be builders. Then I'd hire 50 additional bloggers employed with the DNC, 10 in each new regional HQ's, and 10 operating out of DC. They would be the integrators. Then I'd invite 2 million people into the process of helping to build the new infrastructure that integrates whatever technology that people use together, toward political ends, decentralized from control, soley a means to communicating, rapidly and effectively. They would be the clients.

Why were we encouraging people who never swallowed a single political TV ad to donate money to run political TV ads?

You say that in such wishingly past tense. I need just $5M to fund the above, and to revolutionize the way politics is done. The Riverfront Media shell got over $100M from the DNC/Kerry campaign in 2004. We don't even know where the money went, as it's a private LLC.

I wish, but that's the reality.

by Jerome Armstrong on Mon Feb 21, 2005 at 07:33:15 PM EST

Re: Here's what I would do (none / 0)

You've got that right Jerome. I forget the exact numbers, but cutting the ad budget by half would free up a tremendous amount of money for more effective approaches. I think that is a minimum reduction in ad expenditures.

I don't know how many people have the expertise to put together, manage a run the type of operation described. The management structure would have to provide the same type of instant feedback and flexibility to change that is proposed for the rapid response team to issues. There will inevitably be mis-steps and dead ends that would have to be quickly identified and responded to.

I would suggest a regional approach where five or six independent groups each tried to implement this program with oversight and feedback mechanisms so each group could learn from the others (1) what works and (2) adapt what works to regional ideosyncrasies.

Your blogging infrastructure could be an ideal mechanism to communicate and move feedback up the food chain to decision makers as well as a method of delivering the message of the week, or message du jour, in the other direction. Communication, far more than money, looks like the key element to actually implementing this ambitious agenda. Bloggers are uniquely positioned to make the kind of rapid communication necessary a reality. Not just two way communication, but horizontal communication between regions, as well as two way vertical communication.

by Gary Boatwright on Mon Feb 21, 2005 at 08:43:15 PM EST
[ Parent ]

Re: Face-to-face or New Model? Much confusion! (none / 0)

I don't think anyone (hear or in the DNC) is suggesting "the perfect storm" is a good model.  Face to face contacts with neighbors is much better than face to face contacts with strangers from out of state.  Tangentially political contacts are better than pushy/strident "vote for joe" contacts.  

Building a sense of local community through service projects and a broad pragmatic bipartisan community improvement agenda during the political off season seems optimal to me.

by Lystrosaurus on Mon Feb 21, 2005 at 07:34:34 PM EST

Re: Face-to-face or New Model? Much confusion! (none / 0)

House parties are an effective means of building party support.  Where  you and your neighbors get together for a barBQ party, a "wine and cheese"  party, a neighborhood association party, etc., with a candidate or candidates in attendance to just talk to people, is extremely effective.  I did a lot of door to door canvassing locally last year, and my sense was that I was spinning my wheels.  These are "cold calls", where the people at the house you visit are bothered by being interrupted, disinterested in politics, even a month before the election, and have no social ties to you to make for a good discussion.  I see such activity as one of the biggest wastes of volunteer time imaginable.
by Sacramentohop on Mon Feb 21, 2005 at 08:47:08 PM EST
[ Parent ]

The most effective thing the Dean Campaign did (none / 0)

The most effective thing the Dean Campaign did, was to concentrate on making tools available to local people.  That means making it easier to organize house parties, invite people, ask for volunteers, etc.  My hope is that Dean will to some extent replicate that for the Democratic Party.  That, in my opinion, is how you energize a bottom-up organization.  And, I wish the party would embrace the meetup concept, as flawed as it is.  Meetups played a big part in making local people feel involved in the campaign, and were very effective when given a goal or a project for each meetup.  Best of all would be a Democratic Party organized quasi-meetup system to build involvement locally.
by Sacramentohop on Mon Feb 21, 2005 at 08:54:53 PM EST

Re: The most effective thing the Dean Campaign did (none / 0)

I agree.  My only push is to the idea of "making local people feel involved in the campaign".  

There is a lot of busy work that makes people "feel" involved  but if we are to really get it right we need to actually involve folks as genuine partners in direction, strategy and choices of the campaign.  

The most powerful (and smartest) thing Dean did was ask 600,000 supporters the federal matching funds question. They actually made the most significant decision in the process.  The blog did help the tech team prioritize things to fix and many great ideas flowed from users feedback.  The party needs to adopt a new strategy that is much more direct distributed management.

by MartyKearns on Fri Feb 25, 2005 at 12:48:50 AM EST
[ Parent ]

Nice post (none / 0)

I'm swallowed in midterms so I'll leave it at that.
The Kentucky Democrat
by kydem on Mon Feb 21, 2005 at 09:31:32 PM EST

Missing the point? (3.00 / 1)

Despite the nearly three-fold increase on money spent in the 2004 Presidential election cycle versus the 2000 Presidential election cycle, voter participation only increased from 55.3% of the voting eligible population to 60.7%...

The lesson from that is not that we need some new, clever way to increase voter turnout. The lesson is that SOME PEOPLE JUST WON'T VOTE. Turnout has never been higher than 65% in the last 80 years. Through the Great Depression, through WWII, Korea and Vietnam, through the Cold War and the civil rights movement, it's never been any higher. And since 18-20 year-olds got the right to vote (and their low participation rate dragged down the average), it's never been higher than 60% -- the level it was this year. This was simply the best it ever gets.

Further, despite the increase in applied resources, fewer people than ever changed their minds during the course of the campaign. What went wrong? Why did both parties receive such small returns on such enormous investments?

Simple. As with any incumbent-vs.-challenger race, this election was a referendum on the incumbent. The public already had 4 years to decide how they felt about Bush, and their opinion of him was well-established. No amount of voter contacts or TV ads were going to change their mind.

Bush was in the precarious position of having about an approval rating of about 50%. To tip the election to his side, he just had to make Kerry look like a worse choice. A few "Swift Boat" lies, a few "flip-flopper" accusations that Kerry reinforced with his own verbal gaffes ("voting for it before he voted against it," etc.) and Bush had 51%, which is all he needed.  The end.

The 2008 race will be different, because there won't be an incumbent.  Let's not, as they say in the military, "fight the last war," basing our strategy purely on what did or didn't work the last time. Traditional tactics that seemed to fail in 2004 could be very effective when the voters don't have fully-formed opinions of the candidates yet.

The party needs to aggressively experiment with alternative channels to reach the public including music, arts, poetry, story telling, cultural events, video games and service work.

Puhleeeze!  That hippy crap don't fly in red states. Do you really think Kerry would have won any more votes that way? Let's not confuse the medium with the message. The candidate's image and message are key, and with the right ones, traditional media will work just fine. With the wrong ones, no medium and no method of organizing will be enough.

by Horq on Tue Feb 22, 2005 at 01:57:26 AM EST

True-there are no more new voters to be found (none / 0)

Any proposal that starts, "We need to get new voters to the polls." is useless (unless you are referring to voters that just became eligible, by age or citizenship status).  Getting occasional voters to the polls is one thing-but we aren't going to get many truely new voters anytime soon.  Assuming Bush doesn't completely and blatantly fuck up the country in such a total fashion that the country wants change NOW, no new voters are going to be super motivated next time.  2004 was probably the high point in voter parcipitation during our lifetimes.

What we need to do is convince people that voted for Bush to vote for our guy (or girl) in 2008 and for other Dems in 06 and 08 (without losing Kerry voters in the process).  We don't need to get many to switch-three or four percent of Bush voters would do it.  We just need a good canidate (and we also need a lousy one on the other side-everybody on thier side is crap, except McCain).

by Geotpf on Tue Feb 22, 2005 at 04:25:10 AM EST
[ Parent ]

Re: Missing the point? (none / 0)

Puhleeeze!  That hippy crap don't fly in red states. Do you really think Kerry would have won any more votes that way?

Uh. Sory bro, you have no legs to stand on here. I worked for Music for America, a group that used culture, and specifically concerts, to reach out to younger voters, with pretty good results.

Not only do I think that Kerry would have won more votes, I'm positive that he did. According to Youth Votes:

In the Keystone state, we estimate that 18-29 year old turnout increased by about 75 percent over four years ago. By comparison, the total turnout in Pennsylvania was up 16 percent.

Under-30 voters in Pennsylvania made up 21 percent of turnout this year and backed Kerry, 60 percent to 39 percent for Mr. Bush. Kerry ended up winning the state by about a two percent margin, which made the overall election competitive for quite a while; had he not squeaked that one out, we all would have gotten a lot more sleep Tuesday night.

While I agree that choosing good candidates is essential to winning elections, communicating efectively with "the masses" is equally important. So the question becomes what is the most effective avenue to communicate with people, and the answer is peer to peer contact.

I'd also like to note that focusing on younger voters avoids one of the pitfalls that you seem to be pointing to, biases favoring one candidate over another. In general, the views of people under the age of 30 are less set in stone than their elders, and thus campaigns aimed at communicating with them have greater chances of success. But younger voters also tend to be pretty cynical, and so reaching them through traditional communications avenues will have minimal effects.

Future Majority / Young Philly Politics
by Alex Urevick on Tue Feb 22, 2005 at 11:44:17 AM EST
[ Parent ]

Re: Missing the point? (none / 0)

>>Let's not confuse the medium with the message. The candidate's image and message are key, and with the right ones, traditional media will work just fine. With the wrong ones, no medium and no method of organizing will be enough.<<

The jump the paper looks for is not some hippy crap that won;t sell in the RED states.  The intent was to look at culture as it is emerging..wired,connected, mobile,information rich with new communications channels and find ways to move effective messages into those new pipelines which do include movies, games, poetry, etc.

This is not new the Apollo 13 and Right Stuff movies gave NASA new support on the hill and in appropriations battles. The current Governor of California is another prime example of moving key messages in nontraditional (not just paid TV ads) pipelines.

Communications is Always about defining a target audience. Understanding the change you want to make in that audience. Understanding the key message that the audience member needs to hear to change behavior and finding multiple pathways to move the message to the audience.  I am not advocating any change in that process flow only the vehicles that we plan to use in 2006 and 2008.  

Unless you are suggesting that TV spots should continue to be the most effective (And only pipeline the Party uses (i.e.. 90% of budget) to move messages to the audience then we don't disagree.  

The HIPPY CRAP flame really doesn't add much fun to the discussion.

by MartyKearns on Fri Feb 25, 2005 at 12:24:25 AM EST
[ Parent ]

Were some ads effective? (none / 0)

I thought that such ads as the Swift Boat Veterans for Lies, the Windsurfing ad, and the Wolves ad were thought to have been pretty effective. To be sure, this doesn't contradict that much money was wasted on ads. But if you buy that these were effective, what is it that these ads have in common which was missing from Democratic (and other Repub) ads?

Of course, they were supported by the talk-shows and other media as well. But I don't this is a full explanation. Is it that they effectively re-framed the debate? In other words, is it the message, not the medium?

Were any of the Democratic ads effective? Going beyond the DNC ads, what about other ads such as the MoveOn ones?

by Hong Kong Chevy on Tue Feb 22, 2005 at 02:45:12 AM EST

Re: Were some ads effective? (none / 0)

These ads had little to do with issues and everything to do with the candidate.

Kerry is a traitor/fraud. Kerry is a rich playboy. Kerry will not keep us safe.

These ads reframed the election from being a referendum on the incumbent to being a referendum on the challenger, and they were very effective. I know many people who didn't like Bush but voted for him anyway because they believed Kerry was worse.

by wayward on Wed Feb 23, 2005 at 09:12:20 AM EST
[ Parent ]

bowling alone? (none / 0)

i'm actually right in the thick of bowling alone as i read this post, and it's an interesting contrast.

bowling alone documents the decline of "social capital" in the u.s. - a part of which are the locally-based mass membership organizations discussed in this post.  it also documents the importance of social capital to government, education, public health, public safety; and it investigates the major reasons for this decline.  the conclusion: the death of the WWII generation and the spread of TV are the largest reasons for the decline of social capital; sprawl is another contributing factor, but less important than TV and the death of the WWII generation.

i'm still somewhat skeptical about the book's argument.  but in the main i see a tension between putnam's conclusion - that we need to rebuild social capital as it used to exist - and chris's - that we need to attach to the new mechanism of civic engagement.

i will say i'm more critical of this post than of putnam's.  for one thing, putnam's conclusion sits on a much larger body of evidence.  for another, this post doesn't really specify what the new mechanism of civic engagement is, or how it's fundamentally different than the old mode.  this post is also excessively technophilic.  as powerful as email and some of the other new communication technologies are, they are not the alpha and omega.  direct mail and person to person politics still have a very important role to play, and i would say were among the most effective tactics in this last election.  ask Neighbor to Neighbor or DFA.  finally, i sense in this post an lefty-centric worldview.  this post essentially ignores the huge gains made by evangelical churches in the last two decades, for example.

maybe i'm missing something, but i think this "new" approach has a lot to prove and a very tall mountain of evidence to produce before i'll buy the conclusion that attaching ourselves to the new mechanism of civic engagement is better than rebuilding the civic infrastructure that has dwindled in the past thirty/forty years.

from my vantage point (granted, in uber-lefty cambridge, ma, but with a background in the burbs of st. louis as well), the great majority of the advances in political organizing have been built around local, face-to-face interactions.  some of the most vibrant groups here, as well as in st. louis, are dedicated to development and zoning issues, which are intensely local affairs and intrinsically require face to face interaction.  on the other side of the aisle, the revolution in political participation of the last several decades has been the creation of a conservative farm team that has taken over school boards across the country.

i think there is much to be said for anticipating and adapting to change, but i remain unconvinced that eschewing face to face interaction in favor of, e.g., a Yahoo group/text messaging-centric communications strategy is a good idea.

by myddaholic on Tue Feb 22, 2005 at 12:52:44 PM EST

Re: bowling alone? (none / 0)

Bowling alone is an important read. The concepts of "social capital" are at the heart of many network-centric strategies.

We all know that networks (mom's groups, old boy, school alumni networks, etc.)  The problem is that as a party that needs the social capital to create change, build coalitions and hold communities firm against the Republican machine.  We need social capital but we do not invest in it.  We do not measure it.  We are busy building financial capital which is not a substitute for social capital.

The post is not about technology at all.  It is about a perspective on the way technology and connectivity (cheap travel, media overexposure, etc) is changing culture.   As culture changes, we must update strategies to operate in new context. (Political mobilization and strategy changed with the birth of the industrial age so to must it change in an information age.)

I am 100% behind the power of local networks. The tools and investments at every level should benefit the local zoning fights. It is essential that all of us organizers have access to a local voter file (and the rich data the party has on your block).  The PTA for the local public school should have a phone bank tool and mass email tool that the party uses.  

The struggle is not creating a division between face to face or some technology (2004 cycle was arguably the most face-to-face ground operation ever ..on both sides)  The post is promoting local and distributed strategy approach vs. a national top down approach to tools.

Tell a friend results should not only be seen by some geek in a campaign headquarters but by the person that added the friends to the list.

Communications strategy should be created, stored and distributed through local people in local networks not just direct mail from a bulk mailer or fed across TV bands.  

Party of the people should trust the grassroots (with all our problems) and invest in giving them the training and capacity to organize not lock it all into inside the beltway professionals.

by MartyKearns on Fri Feb 25, 2005 at 01:08:19 AM EST
[ Parent ]

Direct Democracy - Opinion collection AKA voting. (none / 0)

Our grassroots infrastructure is outdated. The party does not have a winning outreach and engagement strategy.

The fact that thousands (millions) of people are hungering/thirsting to participate in the political process is the message I got/get from the Dean/blogosphere phenomonem.

The biggest advantage we (and that does not always include the Democratic Party) have over the right is that we actually believe in democracy. We believe in collective decision making, they don't.

The internet is providing us with the tools we have needed to finally turn that belief to our advantage. There is nothing more politically engaging and better at reaching out than voting.

Direct Democracy is an example of a technology that is becoming available now. The Democratic party needs to begin moving on such a technology. It's not all we/they should be doing but it's a good one.

Jeff Wegerson - PrairieStateBlue
by wegerje on Tue Feb 22, 2005 at 12:54:38 PM EST


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