Once again, for those who were not around the first time, here is how the discussion will work. I will post a summary of the book in the extended entry, trying to limit my comment on the subject matter as much as possible. Readers will then post their review of the book as new comments. Discussion of the book will branch off from individual reviews. Any new comments that are not replies to other comments must be book reviews. My summary of the book's basic argument follows in the extended entry.
To answer the question in the title first, the great populist narrative of our time, which also happens to be the dominant conservative narrative of our time, The Great Backlash, is the matter with Kansas, according to Frank. The Great Backlash originated in the late 1960’s, and takes as its primary aim to “nurture a cultural class war.” (128)
The book argues that the import of the Great Backlash narrative is that it is populist, powerful and purely cultural—a populist crusade against elites entirely drained and utterly devoid of economic populism. Like the great populist movements of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, the Great Backlash is a crusade against a perceived elitism that is crushing the “common man.” As Frank points out, like the Great Backlash, many of these earlier forms of populism either also came from the Great Plains, or at least also had tremendous resonance there, especially in Kansas:
But its periodic bouts with leftism were what really branded Kansas with the mark of the freak. Every part of the country in the nineteenth century had labor upheavals and protosocialist reform movements, of course. In Kansas, though the radical kept coming out on top. It was as though the blank landscape prompted dreams of a blank-slate society, a place where institutions might be remade as the human mind saw fit. Maps of the state from the 1880’s show a hamlet (since vanished) called Radical City; in nearby Crawford County the town of Girad was home to Appeal to Reason, a socialist newspaper whose circulation was in the hundreds of thousands. In that same town, in 1908, Eugene Debs gave a fiery speech accepting the Socialist Party’s nomination for president; in 1912, Debs actually carried Crawford County, one of the four he won nationwide. (All were in the Midwest.) In 1910, Theodore Roosevelt signaled his own lurch to the left by traveling to Kansas and giving an inflammatory address in Osawatomie, the one-time home of John Brown.
The most famous freakout of them all was Populism, the first of the great American leftist movements. Populism tore through othe4r states as well—wailing all across the Texas, the South, and the West in the 1890’s—but Kansas was the place that really distinguished itself by its enthusiasm. Driven to the brink of ruin by years of bad prices, debt, and deflation, the state’s farmers came together un huge meetings were homegrown troublemakers like Mary Elizabeth Lease exhorted them to “raise less corn and more hell.” The radicalized farmers marched through the small towns in day long parades, raging against what the called the “money power.” And despite all the clamor, they still managed to take the state’s traditional Republican masters utterly by surprise in 1890, sweeping the small-town slicksters out of office and ending the carets of many a career politician. In the decade that followed they elected Populist governors, Populist Senators, Populist congressmen, Populist Supreme court justices, Populist city councils, and probably Populist dogcatchers too; men of strong ideas, curious nicknames, and a colorful patios. (31-33)
(My first critique, and I know I should just be summarizing, is that all of the radicalism he describes in Kansas occurred a long time ago, and we should not expect that in a mobile society that certain areas will always remain the same. Further, areas such as Rochester, New York, a long way from the Midwest and the town where I was born, were actual far more radical than anywhere in Kansas, and are now deep blue. The abolitionist, suffrage and prohibitionist movements all either originated or found their national headquarters in Rochester in the 1840’s, before Kansas was even a state. Where does Frank think those original Free Soilers came from? And does he think Kansas was going to be that way forever? William Jennings Bryan has been gone for a looong time. Anyway, I digress…)
However, unlike in earlier times, when populist movements simultaneously merged cultural and economic crusades against the elite, for the Great Backlash elitism, while still the enemy, is not defined by economics at all, but entirely by culture affectation. In fact, the narrative of the Great Backlash redefines the nature of class to focus not on the material, but purely upon the cultural. According to the Great Backlash, being elite is not about your income, it is instead about what you eat, where you shop, what you watch on TV or at the movies, and where you were educated.
Now, you could argue that where you eat, shop and are educated have everything to do with income and material issues, but then you would not be understanding the narrative at play. Ordering a $25 steak is not being elitist, but ordering a $5 veggie burger would be. Buying a $50 ticket to a NASCAR event is not elitist, but buying a $20 ticket to a soccer game is. Being Buddhist is elite, being Pentecostal is not. Being humble is, having a Ph.D. is not, even if you earned the Ph.D. on full scholarship. The difference between being elite and not being elite has nothing to do with money at all, but instead about your tastes and attitude about the world.
According to the Great Backlash, culture is class, and the heart of culture is a conflict between liberalism and the common:
Of course, this oppression of the common man by the liberal elite is purely cultural. The control and production of vulgar popular culture is a necessary element of liberalism that exists in Hollywood, outside the realm of electoral politics. The control and production of scientific studies is a necessary element of liberalism, performed in anti-democratic academia where the common is not allowed. Production and control of the news media as a means of indoctrinating the nation with leftist thought is a necessary element of liberalism Control of the anti-democratic judiciary is a necessary element of liberalism as well. Rather than being a cause of other forces, liberalism is a social force unto itself, and control of anti-democratic, culture producing institutions is simply what liberalism does. Liberals themselves are elitists who control these anti-democratic institutions, and do so in order to deride, oppress, and otherwise thwart the decency of the commons.
This is one of the keys to the narrative. The Great Backlash is primarily a working class movement against “the elite” that views everything through the lens of culture, is entirely drained of economic populism, and is fatalistic. Liberals simply control all of anti-democratic cultural producing institutions and there is nothing that can be done about it, no matter how many conservatives there are in Congress. While the populist narrative works as political agitation, it is a permanent narrative and never has to succeed in order to maintain its force. The narrative has neither an endgame nor a dream of progress. Conservatives could control 90% of the seats in Congress, never deliver a single culture war victory or even slow down the increasing vulgarity of culture, but that would not matter to the Great Backlash. Liberalism does not exist within a democratic framework. It is understood as an inherently anti-democratic social force that controls the anti-democratic institutions that produce the culture that oppresses humble America. Liberalism, as a social force, has agency, subjectivity and will over the production of culture, while the common and Democracy do not. While hating liberalism is thus a tremendous tool for political agitation, The Great Backlash never has to succeed in defeating liberalism once in power in order to maintain credibility as a political force. Liberalism can be kicked out of electoral politics, but that barely evens dents liberalism, according to the Great Backlash, because liberalism’s great strength comes from its control of anti-Democratic institutions.
This sort of mindset, Frank argues, is only possible if the economic is entirely drained from popular conscious. For the economic to be entirely drained from popular consciousness itself requires the institution of very economic program the Great Backlash furthers, even if it is only a secondary aim:
Indeed, the economic blindness of backlash conservatism is also a product, in large part, of those same commercial cultural enterprises. Conservatives are only able to ignore economics the way they do because they live in a civilization whose highest cultural expressions—movies, advertisements, and sitcoms—have for decades insisted on downplaying the world of work. Conservatives are only able to compartmentalize business as a realm totally separate from politics because the same news media whose “liberal bias” they love to deride has long accepted just such compartmentalization as a basic element of professional journalistic practice. (128-129)
Frank argues that this has led to an enormous class divide within the Republican party, where the radical conservatives tend to be working class, and the moderates tend to be professional and investor class. Take, for example, an interview Frank conducted with Kay O’Connor, a Kansan and one of the great working class heroes of the new conservative narrative, who recently suggested that women’s suffrage was a bad thing:
The one who is more materialistic or more interested in building resumes, and running for office, and being the CEO, or owning a big company, and having the material things… that is the person who is more moderate, and they understand what it takes to get to the top of the mountain to get to the top of the heap. You gotta work hard, and sometimes you stomp on people. The conservative, on the other hand, he just wants to go to church on Sunday, or he wants to go fishing on Sunday, and he just kind of wants to be left alone. (169-170)
In addition to the complete subsuming of economic issues into cultural issues, this interview with O’Connnor is another key point. The populist, working class movement that Frank describes as working against its own economic interests is primarily a movement of working class Republicans becoming far more radically conservative than their still conservative, but supposedly moderate, professional and upper-class Republican counterparts. While the Backlash Narrative has the possibility to spread to every segment of the working class population, for now it is largely centered within the Republican working class. Frank argues that in contemporary America, radical conservatism of the culture war and economic kind is a working class movement, while tradition Republicanism of only the economic kind (that despises the culture war kind) is a middle and upper-class Republican movement. The narrative has caught on with recently downtrodden members of the white working class some areas, even in formerly democratic areas after NAFTA (more on that below), but for now it is largely a Republican-only phenomenon whose greatest battles are being carried out within the Republican Party itself between rich “Mods” and working class “Cons.” It is a great, populist, working class Republican crusade to make the Republican party even more ludicrously favorable to the wealthy, the corporate, and the aristocratic, while further destroying its own self interest, all in the name of a culture war that they themselves admit cannot be won. The movement is growing however, and its potential to spread should not be underestimated.
Despite the massive intra-party struggles, the alliance between “moderate” pro-wealthy, but anti-culture war, conservatives with rabidly anti-modernist conservatives who believe wealth is the product of negative personality traits and who only adhere to the culture war has yielded the most conservative, wealth distribution legislation since the twenties. The common has no agency to alter culture, but it sure can alter economics. As Frank argues:
The narrative is, of course, total bullshit. It started against imagined, and/or overblown bullshit from the sixties, and it is the same now. It holds up to no actual scrutiny whatsoever. Liberals do not control the institutions the narrative claims it does. Liberals do not do the things, or hold the positions, the narrative claims it does. Further, liberals are clearly not elitists, as exit poll after exit poll repeatedly shows that liberals are much poorer than conservatives. However, these three obvious falsehoods about the narrative do not matter, for several reasons:
Want to change things? Well, the first solution for Democrats is to burn he DLC at the stake. Taking economic issues off the table and selling out the working class in order to appeal to the corporate elite was the worst decision Democrats ever made. Frank argues this not out of morality, but in terms of pure electability. With economic issues off the table, much of the white working class that once supported Democrats now hates our guts. If you have trade, abortion and guns on the table, and you take trade off the table, whom do you think the white working class will support? A return to economic populism is the only solution, according to Frank—identify the real elites for who they are. The corporate elites, after all, are the real elites, not those who happen to drive a Volvo. However, as long as the Democratic Party is defending corporate elites instead of the working class, the Backlash narrative will continue to grow in power, and spread to more and more demographics.
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