Many have asked what the Partisan Index is useful for, especially when viewed in isolation without its equally important counterpart, the national popular vote. I suppose after the first three part of this series, that finally deserves an explanation. This explanation ties directly into why the McGovern campaign was so groundbreaking for the Democratic Party, and why in the aftermath of the 2004 election is still remains so controversial. Never the less, I feel we have no choice but to follow it.
I believe that partisan index can reveal the underlying strengths and weaknesses an electoral coalition that can be obscured by the specific vote totals in a given state in a given year. For example, while Reagan won New York in 1984, as he in fact won forty-nine states, the strong pro-DNC partisan index in New York showed that it was still a weak state for Republicans. When, over the next five cycles, the Democratic nominee came much closer to the Republican nominee in the popular vote, that weakness was revealed in the form of five consecutive blowout losses in New York for the Republican nominee. In fact, despite Reagan's nationwide success, the partisan index still showed Republicans to be weak throughout the northeast, and that the problem was growing worse. That also was better revealed when Democratic nominees started receiving a higher percentage of the national popular vote than they did in the 1980's.
Also, as I hoped I showed convincingly in the first part of this series, the partisan index also demonstrates a chronic weakness for Democrats in the south. Over the last five cycles when a southern Democrat was the nominee, the Democratic position in the southern partisan index became progressively weaker in each of the cycles. Not only has the pro-Republican contemporary nature of the south in relation to the rest of the nation not been alleviated by the continued presence of southern Democrats on the national ticket, the region is actually still becoming more and more pro-Republican as time goes by. We all know the problem for Democrats in the south is bad. The partisan index shows that the position is actually catastrophic, and consistently growing even worse.
Similarly, while McGovern lost big in almost every state in 1972, the partisan indices from that year were the first to reveal the modern Democratic coalition. Yes, McGovern lost in the South as he lost pretty much everywhere, but he really got clocked in the south, much worse than he did in the rest of the nation. Only in West Virginia, Texas and Kentucky did McGovern do better than an RNC +14 partisan index anywhere in the south. In fact, it was the first time in decades, if not ever, that the south was a Republican region in the partisan index--and it was heavily Republican. Still further, it was at least not until 2000, and arguably not until 2004, that another candidate performed as poorly in the South in the partisan index as McGovern. In both cycles, for the first times since McGovern, all fifteen southern states had a pro-Republican index. Just look at these similarity among these three maps:
Southern Partisan Index, 1972

Southern Partisan Index, 2000

Southern Partisan Index, 2004

On the other hand, McGovern did exceptionally well in the North. In fact, it was not until 1996 that another Democratic candidate performed as well in the north in the partisan index. It was not until 2004 that a candidate performed better. Again, look at the similarity among these three maps:
Northern Partisan Index, 1972

Northern Partisan Index, 1996

Northern Partisan Index, 2004

In both the north and the south, McGovern forecasted the post-New Deal future of the Democratic coalition almost exactly. His northern maps and southern maps look completely different from Carter's, but they look almost exactly like our current maps.
Most importantly, that brings us to the West. In the West, McGovern performed exceptionally well for a Democrat of his time. He performed more than ten points better than Humphrey in Arizona, California, Idaho, Montana, Nebraska, New Mexico, North Dakota, Oregon and South Dakota. He also improved on Humphrey in Alaska, Colorado, Kansas, Nevada and Washington. From 1976-2000, only Dukakis ever came close to McGovern's performance in the Western partisan index. Only Kerry was able to equal it. Here are Kerry and McGovern's Western Partisan Index maps:
Western Partisan Index, 1972

Western Partisan Index, 2004

Now, compare these Western Partisan Index maps to the ones produced under southern Democratic nominees (see the third post in this series). The difference is clear--Kerry and McGovern both did much, much better. Simply put, it is my contention that McGovern's campaign first revealed the possible shape of a post-New Deal, truly liberal Democratic coalition, by bringing together the North with most of the West. This is the overall partisan index map that is now coming into focus:
National Partisan Index, 1972

National Partisan Index, 2004

Compared to 1976
:

Two paths have diverged in the woods, and the nation has walked down the McGovern path, rather than the Carter path. There is no turning back now.
Conclusion
Interestingly, if one were to look at the Dukakis partisan index map of the West, it would look a lot more like the McGovern and Kerry maps of the West than it would the Carter or Clinton maps of the West (see part three of this series for more on this). While it would be premature for me to draw the conclusion based on these maps that non-southern Democrats do much better in the West than southern Democrats, I do at least have a theory as to why it seems to be the case. It has to do with comparing, broadly defined, the two basic strategies employed by Democratic nominees since 1968. If you will forgive me for sounding like David Brooks for a moment, I call them the McGovern strategy and the Carter strategy. I should note that these two strategies define more how Democrats act in a given cycle when nominating a president than how their nominees act.
However, the main drawback to this is not just wasted energy in trying to determine which southerner is the most electable and can best appeal to the region when no one except for conservatives probably can, but that if you run a campaign based on appealing to a particular region, you become disconnected from other regions of the country. Specifically, if you run a campaign designed to appeal to the south through a candidate that shares southern regional characteristics, you seem to have a very difficult time connecting to all of the various regions of the West. Overtly trying to appeal to one region of the country can easily cause resentment in others.
However, I believe that it is only by running a nationwide ideological campaign, rather than one designed to appeal to a particular region, that we can continue to release our potential strength in the more or less post-regional (or at least highly diverse) West. Considering that over 90% of Democrats do not self-identify as conservative, this campaign will almost certainly caused us to get clocked everywhere in the conservative South except Florida (and, to a lesser extent, Virginia and Missouri as well). That is a key clarification I would like to make. I am not saying that we abandon the South, but I am suggesting a strategy that I fully expect will cause us to get destroyed in the South. I would like to be proven wrong, but I do not expect to be (then again, I've said that before).
In the 1970's the Carter strategy was clearly the better way to go. Forgetting the partisan index, just look at what happened in actual national vote to McGovern in 1972 and Mondale in 1984. They were beaten so badly nationally, the gains they made in the partisan index were almost invisible. Even in 1992, following the 1988 debacle, it was still pretty clear that the Carter strategy was the better way to go. As a high school senior, I voted for Jerry Brown in the 1992 New York State primary. However, I was not sad at all when it became clear--largely as a result of his win in New York--that Clinton would be the nominee. I even prayed that he would select Al Gore, because I believed the two of them gave us our best chance to win. Needless to say, 1992 was a very happy year for me.
Now, in 2004, not only is it no longer clear that the Carter strategy would give us a better chance to win, looking at the partisan index in the South I am pretty darn certain that the McGovern plan gives us a chance to win. Further, apart from the collapse of Democratic fortunes in the South, from 37.52% in 1972, to 40.56% in 1984, to 45.65% in 1988, and now to 48.13% in 2004, we are coming closer to a national majority every time we employ the McGovern strategy. This time, we hit 252 electoral votes, and came within inches of many more. Quite frankly, I feel we either follow a once successful, but now obsolete strategy, or we continue to build the McGovern coalition to the point of majority manifestation, which is now within our grasp.
. We can still nominate a southerner, but not in the hope that the very southern-ness of that person will somehow make them more likely to compete in the south. It won't. Further, unless we nominate either Mark Warner of Virginia or one of the two Florida Senators, I do not believe that there are any non-conservative Democrats from the south who have a better chance of flipping even one more southern state than a non-conservative Democrat from any other part of the country.
McGovern's campaign was not just about being liberal, of course. It was also about embracing the grassroots. That is something we are also coming to accept, although there is still a struggle. Whenever I read about the DNC movement to stop Dean, "move to the center," or try to perform some other well worn and gradually less effective trick to stay in power, I deeply fear for our future. When I see blogs and diaries on blogs exploding with polls about which two southern governors we need on the ticket in 2008 in order to have any chance of winning, I deeply fear for the future of our party. The worst thing we could do is to abandon this journey--which in truth was started by Eugene McCarthy in the 1968 primaries--even though after four decades we are almost there. Our new majority coalition awaits us. We need to run the national campaign that will allow us to seize it.
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